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We empirically study the impact of interim rank on risk taking and
performance using data on professionals competing in tournaments
for large rewards. As we observe both the intended action and the
performance of each participant, we can measure risk taking and per-
formance separately. We present two key findings. First, risk taking ex-
hibits an inverted-U relationship with interim rank. Revealing infor-
mation on relative performance induces individuals trailing just behind
the interim leaders to take greater risks. Second, competitors systemat-
ically underperformwhen ranked closer to the top, despite higher incen-
tives to perform well. Disclosing information on relative ranking hinders
interim leaders.
I. Introduction
Individuals competing in tournaments are rewarded on the basis of their
relative, rather than absolute, performance. Many everyday fields of eco-
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nomic activity are characterized by such a tournament-like structure. Em-
ployees and managers in labor markets, for example, are subject to rela-
tive performance evaluations within a firm; in financial markets, mutual
funds compete in attracting new funds on the basis of their relative per-
formance; in product markets, companies compete in patent races to
secure the rights to new products; in schools, students and teachers may
be ranked according to their relative performance; and, finally, the ma-
jority of sporting events are organized as tournaments.
An extensive literature emphasizes the role of tournaments in realign-
ing the incentives of the parties involved ðLazear and Rosen 1981; Green
and Stokey 1983;Nalebuff and Stiglitz 1983Þ. For instance, in the labormar-
ket, a tournament among managers could provide incentive for improved
effort resulting in higher performance, thus mitigating the typical ineffi-
ciencies caused by the conflicting objectives ofmanagers and shareholders.
However, it is likely that tournaments affect not only choices concern-
ing effort but other aspects of individual behavior as well, including risk
taking and performance under pressure. In addition, tournaments are
often dynamic, so the incentives generated by the competition may be
different for individuals leading in the competition and those lagging
behind. Individuals with a high interim rank, for example, may try to
protect their position by decreasing risk taking. Those lower down in the
interim rank may engage in riskier strategies in an attempt to catch up
with the leaders. Exactly how agents’ risk-taking behavior and perfor-
mance vary depending on relative performance in previous stages of the
competition is still an open question and is fundamental to our under-
standing of tournaments in labor, financial, and product markets. From
a policy point of view, it is crucial to understand how disclosure of infor-
mation on relative performance during a competition may affect partici-
pants’ subsequent behavior.
An important branch of research is devoted to understanding how
the behavior of individuals is affected by tournaments ðEhrenberg and
Bognanno 1990; Knoeber and Thurman 1994; Chevalier and Ellison
1997; Brown 2011Þ and other performance evaluation schemes ðOyer
1998; Lazear 2000; Courty and Marschke 2004; Bandiera, Barankay, and
Rasul 2007Þ. Economic theory suggests that risk taking and performance
depend on how information on relative performance is revealed, but the
shape of the relation between interim rank, risk taking, and performance
and the magnitude of these effects are empirical issues. In practice, little
is known about the impact of interim rank on risk taking and perfor-
mance during a dynamic tournament ðCasas-Arce and Martinez-Jerez
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2009Þ. The main obstacle is the difficulty in separately observing both
the level of risk taken by competitors and their performance during a
tournament.
This paper exploits an unusually rich panel data set derived fromweight
lifting competitions, with individual-level information on professional
athletes competing repeatedly in tournaments with substantial rewards.
Weight lifting competitions are multistage tournaments with the distinc-
tive characteristic of requiring athletes to publicly announce the amount
they intend to lift at each stage. Access to these recorded announcements,
together with information on whether the lift was successful or not, affords
a unique opportunity to observe both the intentions and the performance
of all participants.
Using a panel data set containing round-by-round information from
Olympic Games and World and European Championships between
1990 and 2006, we estimate how the announced weights and the proba-
bility of a successful lift vary depending on interim rank. Since what
matters for an individual’s score is the amount successfully lifted ðmore
details are given in Sec. IIÞ, higher announcements represent a riskier
strategy in the sense that they imply a larger difference between the out-
come in case of success or failure. Therefore, the relation between rank
and announcement is informative of athletes’ risk-taking behavior, while
the relation between rank and the probability of a successful lift is infor-
mative of their performance.
The probability that an athlete will succeed in lifting the declared
weight during a specific attempt is much less than one. This implies that
interim ranking within a competition is very volatile. This variability of
interim ranking provides us with an ideal environment for observing
how professionals react when in the lead or when trailing other compet-
itors. The panel dimension of the data allows us to control for multiple
sources of unobserved heterogeneity at the individual, competition, and
year level. The multistage nature of the games even allows us to estimate
specifications in which we can control for joint individual-competition-
year fixed effects.
We present two key results. First, when lagging behind, competitors
tend to take greater risks than when in the lead. However, risk taking
exhibits an inverted-U relationship with rank: announcements increase
from first to sixth place but decrease moving further down in the rank;
after rank 17, the level of risk taken is not significantly different from that
for first place. The magnitude of the impact of rank is significant. A shift
from first to sixth place corresponds to a 1.8 kilogram ðkgÞ increase in
announcement, which is 50 percent of the average increase in announce-
ment between two stages.
Our results are in line with the conventional wisdom that troubled
firms and interim losers in corporate tournaments aremore likely to take
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riskier strategies than market leaders or that the trailing team in sports
competitions may have a strong incentive to take greater risks. The non-
monotone relation between interim rank and risk taking is consistent
with the observation that catching up with the leaders becomes progres-
sively more unlikely as one moves down in the ranking.
Our second result is that, on average, the probability of a successful lift
ðconditional on the chosen weightÞ significantly increases when moving
down in the ranking. An athlete in sixth place is at least 10 percent more
likely to lift the declared weight than when he is ranked first. It seems
unlikely that athletes exert less effort when ranked at the top.1 An alterna-
tive explanation for this result is that athletes underperform under pres-
sure, despite strong motivation and effort ðDohmen 2008; Ariely 2009;
Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta 2010Þ. This interpretation is consistent
with anecdotal evidence that athletes’ performance may deteriorate as
the stakes rise or when there are strong expectations for an outstanding
performance. In line with the hypothesis that individuals perform badly
underpressure, we show that theprobability of failing to lift a givenweight
is higher when the competition is more intense or more prestigious.
Our work is related to a growing empirical literature on tournaments.
Four key aspects distinguish our work from earlier studies. First, our pa-
per focuses on the effects of interim rank within a tournament. The ex-
isting literature has mainly focused on the impact of the overall level of
prizes or on different compensation schemes.2 Second, most studies
focus on either performance or risk taking. When they do attempt tomea-
sure risk taking, they focus on variability in performance or other output
measures.3 Differently from previous studies, we can measure risk taking
separately from performance, and we can also condition for the intended
strategies of participants when comparing performance.4 Third, we use
1 One would generally expect athletes to be more motivated and to exert greater effort
when ranked at the top, where the gain from an increase in rank is highest. The positive re-
lation between rewards, motivation, and effort seems to be accepted in the literature ðPren-
dergast 1999Þ, although with some exceptions ðCamerer et al. 1997; Gneezy and Rustichini
2000a, 2000b ; Frey and Jegen 2001; Heyman and Ariely 2004Þ.
2 Ehrenberg and Bognanno ð1990Þ and Becker and Huselid ð1992Þ use data from sports
tournaments to study the link between prizes and performance. Knoeber and Thurman
ð1994Þ study the effect of different compensation schemes on the performance of broiler
chicken farmers.Main,O’Reilly, andWade ð1993Þ andEriksson ð1999Þ study corporate tour-
naments and executive compensation.
3 Very little evidence is available on risk-taking behavior in tournaments. Knoeber and
Thurman ð1994Þ provide some evidence that better farmers displayed less volatile perfor-
mance. Brown, Harlow, and Starks ð1996Þ and Chevalier and Ellison ð1997Þ show that mu-
tual funds with relatively lowmidyear performance increase fund volatility. Bronars andOet-
tinger ð2001Þ study variability in performance in golf tournaments. Similarly, Lee ð2004Þ
studies variability in payoffs in poker tournaments, and Grund and Gu¨rtler ð2005Þ find that
losing teams in soccer matches are more likely to make a risky substitution.
4 Consider the case in which leaders in a multistage tournament try to protect their po-
sition by taking low-risk strategies ðstrategies with low payoffs but a high probability of suc-
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an exceptionally rich panel data set that allows us to control for unob-
served heterogeneity in greater detail than previous studies.
II. A Brief Overview of Weight Lifting Competitions and the Data
In weight lifting competitions, athletes attempt to lift heavy weights
mounted on steel bars.5 Lifters perform two types of lifts: the snatch and
the clean & jerk.6 Lifters are allowed six attempts, the first three for
snatch and the remaining for clean & jerk.7 The competition is therefore
organized in six stages.Within each stage, weights are progressively loaded
onto the bar and competitors attempt to lift their desired weight ðcalled
the announcementÞ in increasing order, from the lightest to the heaviest
weight. The sequence of attempts and outcomes of the lifts are displayed
publicly on an announcement board.8
If they are unsuccessful at a particular weight, the athletes have the
option of reattempting the same lift or trying a heavier one in the fol-
lowing stage.9 At the end of the competition, each athlete’s highest suc-
cessful lifts in the snatch and the clean & jerk are summed to determine
their final scores. Athletes are then ranked, with the highest score cor-
responding to first place. In addition, at the end of each stage, interim
rankings are computed using the same procedure.10
The relationship between final rank and prizes is convex, particularly
at the top. The first three athletes are awarded medals and receive most
of the media coverage. Private sponsorships are also offered mainly to
medal winners, and gold medalists receive the lion’s share of fame and
recognition. National teams often provide substantial monetary rewards
cessÞ. If the riskiness involved in such strategies is not observable to the researcher, com-
paring realized payoffs across individuals may not be informative about differences in effort.
5 Weight lifting has a long history as an Olympic discipline. Men’s weight lifting was on
the program of the first modern Olympic Games in Athens in 1896, while the first contem-
porary World Championships took place in London in 1891.
6 In the snatch, they lift the bar to arm’s length above their head in onemovement. In the
clean & jerk, they lift the bar to their shoulders, stand up straight, and then jerk the bar to
arm’s length above their head.
7 Before the start of each game, competitors are weighed and assigned an official body
weight. This then determines the weight category in which they will compete. There are
eight categories for men and seven for women. Athletes may switch between different cat-
egories over the course of their athletic careers. For this reason, our definition of a compet-
itor throughout this paper is an athlete in a particular body weight category.
8 Initial announcements aremade before the beginning of the stage without knowing the
announcements of the others. However, these announcements can be changed during the
course of the stage, provided they do not require unloading weight from the bar. In our data
set, we observe the final announcements, which correspond to the weights effectively at-
tempted by athletes. When two athletes wish to attempt the same weight, a random lot num-
ber publicly assigned at the beginning of the competition determines the order.
9 The weight announced in stage 3 ðthe last attempt in snatchÞ does not affect the an-
nouncement in stage 4 ðthe first attempt in clean & jerkÞ.
10 For the second and third stages, the interim rank is computed using only the best suc-
cessful lift in snatch.
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and other benefits such as civil service jobs or employment in the national
sport federation to medal winners in international competitions.11
Comprehensive round-by-round data for all athletes who participated
in the best-known weight lifting competitions ðthe Olympics and the
World and the European ChampionshipsÞ from 1990 to 2006 were ob-
tained from the International Weightlifting Database, yielding a total of
41,550 individual stage-specific observations for 3,763 athletes. For each
observation, we have information on individual announcements and
outcomes, together with the overall rank at the end of the competition,
as well as at the end of snatch and clean & jerk lifts.12
Using this information, we reconstructed the interim ranking of all
athletes at each stage of the competition.13 Table 1 provides summary sta-
tistics on announcement and frequency of successful lifts. The average
announcement increases from one stage to the next by roughly 3 kg.14
The frequency of successful lifts falls correspondingly by around 20 per-
cent. In general, higher weights can be lifted in the clean & jerk, as re-
flected in the higher average announcements.
Variability of ranking, even for a given athlete within a given compe-
tition, is significant. On average, the difference between the maximum
and minimum interim rank for a given individual within a competition
is 6.4 positions, with the 25th percentile experiencing a change of three
positions and the 75th percentile experiencing a change of eight ranks.
Even very consistent weight lifters may oscillate, for example, between
getting a gold and getting no medal at all.
11 For more information on prizes, see Genakos and Pagliero ð2011Þ.
12 The outcome of 1 percent of the observations is missing because the athlete did not
attempt to lift the announcedweight. Observations relating to such individuals in those spe-
cific competitions are excluded from the sample.
13 Our algorithm to reconstruct ranking was based on the official rules of the International
Weightlifting Federation.We verified the results fromour algorithm against the ranking infor-
mation at the end of both snatch and clean & jerk, as well as the final overall ranking.
14 After a successful attempt, athletes are required to increase their announcements by1kg.
TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics
Snatch Clean & Jerk
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 Stage 6
Announcement ðaverageÞ 122.404 125.953 128.013 150.570 154.808 156.752
Probability of a successful
lift ðaverageÞ .732 .570 .397 .806 .557 .317
Source.—Authors’ calculations based on the International Weightlifting Database cor-
responding to round-by-round athletes’ performance data for themost well-known interna-
tional weight lifting competitions ðthe Olympic Games, World and European Champion-
shipsÞ from 1990 to 2006.
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III. Empirical Framework
A key feature of weight lifting competitions is that the outcome of a spe-
cific lift is uncertain.We characterize each athlete’s ability as a risk-reward
frontier that maps announced weight into the probability of a successful
lift. The probability of success PisðAisÞ of player i 5 1; : : :; N in stage s 5
1; : : :; 6 announcing a weight Ais naturally decreases as the announce-
ment increases ðfig. 1Þ. Competitors can improve the probability of a suc-
cessful lift by increasing the quality and intensity of training before the
competition or by achieving greater concentration/determination dur-
ing the game. However, any variable affecting performance may shift the
frontier, including psychological pressure, fear, or emotions in general.
The choice of the announcement entails a fundamental trade-off be-
tween the gains fromahigher successful lift and the costs of ahigherprob-
ability of failing. A higher announcement implies a larger difference be-
tween the payoff for success and failure and constitutes a riskier strategy.15
Weight lifting competitions can be described by a dynamic tournament
game, where the same-stage game is repeated six times. At each stage, the
bar is progressively loaded, and athletes sequentially choose whether they
wish to attempt the current weight or wait. Hence, at each point of the
game ts in which player i makes a decision ðattempt the current weight
or waitÞ during stage s, there is a well-defined history Htsi of previous de-
cisions and outcomes.16 A ðpureÞ strategy for player i is a function ji that
assigns an action ðwait or lift the current weightÞ to each information set
in which player i makes a decision.
Our first empirical objective is estimating how the announcement de-
cisions depend on the interim ranking.We focus on this specific aspect of
the history for two reasons. First, the literature summarized in Section I
suggests that interim ranking is a key determinant of risk taking in tour-
naments.17 Second, interim ranking is one central piece of information
that is reported by athletes to be fundamental and that is readily available
throughout the competition, so our focus is consistent with how the game
is actually played.
15 For realistic values of the announcement, the probability of a successful lift, and the
slope of the risk-reward frontier, increases in announcement generate gambles that are
second-order stochastically dominated ðin Sec. IV we discuss the magnitude of the impact
of announcements on the probability of a successful liftÞ.
16 This includes decisions ðlift, waitÞ and outcomes ðsuccess, failureÞ of all players in pre-
vious stages and for any lower admissible weight during the current stage. For example, if
the current weight is 100 kg in stage 6, player i observes history Htsi that includes the deci-
sions made by all players in stages 1–5 and their outcomes, decisions and outcomes of all
players in stage 6 for weights up to 99 kg, and possibly those of players with a lower lot num-
ber for 100 kg.
17 This intuition also specifically applies to weight lifting competitions. For a simple com-
petition with one stage only, the rules described above directly imply that interim ranking
affects risk taking in equilibrium.Under some conditions, an inverse-U-shaped relationship
between interim rank and risk taking naturally emerges.
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In principle, however, the observed weight chosen by each athlete at each
stage may depend on the entire history of the game up to that point.
Hence, our empirical identification of the relation between interim rank
and risk taking requires imposing some restrictions on what specific fea-
tures of the history matter for announcements. We start by assuming that
the behavior of others affects player i only through the interim ranking.
We then relax this assumption by allowing history to matter in a more
complex fashion, taking into account measures of proximity of athletes
with similar interim scores and other variables potentially correlated with
interim ranking.We also allow the relation between interim rank and risk
taking to vary across individuals, competition, and stages. This is impor-
tant, as individualsmay have different risk-reward frontiers, competitions
may have different prize levels, and competitors may react differently to
changes in interim ranking depending on the stage of the competition.
The second objective of the paper is to investigate how interim ranking
affects performance.We proceed in a similar way and study how the prob-
ability of a successful outcome Pis depends on the announcement Ais and
on the interim ranking Ris. Performancemay depend on interim ranking
indirectly, through incentives to perform well, or directly, through the
contextual and psychological effects of interim performance. The exist-
FIG. 1.—The athletes’ risk-reward frontier. The figure describes the risk-reward frontiers
for two hypothetical athletes of different ability. The better athlete is characterized by the
frontier located to the right. Each competitor can improve the probability of a successful
lift by increasing the quality and intensity of training before the competition or by having
more concentration/determination during the game. Higher psychological pressure may
cause choking and reduce performance.
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ing literature, reviewed in Section IV.D, suggests that psychological pres-
sure at the top of the ranking may decrease performance. In interpreting
the results inSection IV,wewill discuss these twopossiblechannels through
which interim ranking may affect performance. As for risk taking, we will
also explore other ways in which history may possibly affect performance
and allow for heterogeneity across individuals, competitions, and stages.
A. The Determinants of Announcements
We estimate models of the following general form:
Announcementitjs 5 Xitjb0 1 f ðRankitjðs21Þ; b1Þ
1 b2Announcementitjðs21Þ
1 b3Successitjðs21Þ 1 eitjs;
ð1Þ
where Announcementitjs is the announcement of athlete i in year t in
competition type j ða competition is classified asOlympic Game or World
or European ChampionshipÞ at stage s of the game ðs5 2, 3, 5, 6Þ;18 Xitj is a
vector that includes characteristics of the individual ðbinary indicators
for country of origin and whether competing in the home country, body
weightÞ and of the competition ðe.g., number of competitorsÞ; Rankitjðs21Þ
is the ranking of athlete i in year t in competition j at the end of stage
s21; f ð Þ is a flexible functional form for the relation between interim
rank and announcement; we require f ðÞ to be linear only in the vector
of parameters b1; Successitjðs21Þ is a binary indicator variable that takes the
value of one if the previous attempt was successful; and the random var-
iable eitjs captures the unobserved determinants of an announcement.
Finally, b2 and b3 are scalars, whereas b0 and b1 are vectors of parameters
to be estimated.
Themodel includes success in the previous round because the rules of
the game dictate a minimum increase of 1 kg after a successful attempt.
The level of the previous announcement is also included, as we want to
allow for decreasing increments as the absolute level of the announced
weight increases.19
19 As the minimum increment after a successful attempt is 1 kg, one could rewrite model
ð1Þ as follows:
Announcementitjs 5 ½Announcementitjðs21Þ 1 Successitjðs21Þ
1 ½Xitj b0 1 f ðRankitjðs21Þ; b1Þ
1 b 2Announcementitjðs21Þ 1 b3Successitjðs 2 1Þ 1 eitjs ;
18 The first stage of snatch is dropped because the interim ranking is not defined for the
first stage. In estimatingmodel ð1Þwe also dropped the first stage of clean& jerk because the
impact of previous announcement and success may be very different during the transition
from snatch to clean & jerk, which allows heavier weights to be lifted. The results, however,
are not driven by the inclusion or omission of the first stage of clean & jerk.
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Cross-sectional estimates of model ð1Þwill produce biased estimates of all
parameters, unless one is able to control for the athletes’ ability, which is
likely to affect both interim ranking and announcements. Unobserved
individual ability may also vary over time, as the quality of each athlete’s
training may vary across years or even for different competitions within
the same year. Moreover, the organization of each type of competition
may vary across years in ways that are unobserved to the researcher, and
this may affect athletes’ behavior. Hence, one needs to account for mul-
tiple sources of unobserved heterogeneity.
The error term in ð1Þ can be thought of as the sumof athlete, year, com-
petition, athlete-year, competition-year, athlete-competition, and athlete-
year-competition components:
eitjs 5 ti 1 tt 1 tj 1 ts 1 tit 1 tjt 1 tij 1 titj 1 εitjs ; ð2Þ
where εitjs captures idiosyncratic shocks to the announcement decision,
εitjs ∼ IIDð0; j2ε Þ. Alternative specifications are possible, depending on
whether unobserved heterogeneity is thought to vary across athletes,
years, type of competitions, or their interactions. In the next section, we
will report the results using a number of alternative specifications for the
unobserved heterogeneity.
Since unobserved heterogeneity is likely to be correlated with previous
announcements, performance in previous stages, and therefore interim
rank, the random-effects assumption is unlikely to be appropriate in this
case. Thus, we choose to work with a fixed-effects model. Owing to the
multistage nature of weight lifting competitions, we can include athlete-
year-competitionfixedeffects ðtitjÞ. In this case, the relationbetween interim
rank and announcement is estimated only by exploiting the variability of
ranking across stages of the same competition for a given individual.
However, the existence of a lagged dependent variable in ð1Þ implies
that the fixed-effects estimator may be biased. To overcome this problem
we assume that Rankitjðs21Þ, Announcementitjðs21Þ, and Successitjðs21Þ are pre-
determined; that is, they may be correlated with previous realizations of
εitjs, so they may depend on unobserved determinants of the choice of
the announcement in previous stages, but they are not correlated with
current and future shocks to the announcement decision. Including
these variables in one single vector of regressors Witjðs21Þ, we assume that
Eðεitjsjtitj ;Xitj ;Witjðs21Þ;Witjðs22Þ; : : : ;Witj1Þ5 0.20
where the first bracket is the automatic announcement, dictated by the rules of the game,
and the second is the discretionary announcement, capturing athletes’ risk-taking behavior.
Thus, the function f ð  Þ captures the impact of rank on athletes’ discretionary announce-
ment, while the parameters b2 and b3 in model ð1Þ capture the joint effect on both the au-
tomatic and the discretionary announcement ðb2 5 11 b2; b3 5 11 b3Þ.
20 If f ðRankitjðs21Þ; b1Þ is a polynomial function, thenWitjðs21Þ will includenot only Rankitjðs21Þ
but also its square, cube, etc., depending on the order of the polynomial.
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Consider now the richest specification with athlete-year-competition
fixed effects ðtitjÞ. First-differencing the model eliminates the fixed effects,
DAnnouncementitjs 5 DWitjðs21Þg1 Dεitjs; ð3Þ
and once-lagged predetermined regressors,Witjðs22Þ, are valid instruments
for DWitjðs21Þ, so parameters can be estimated using an instrumental vari-
ables ðIVÞ approach ðAnderson and Hsiao 1981Þ. We also employ more ef-
ficient generalizedmethod ofmoments ðGMMÞ estimators ðArellano and
Bond 1991; Blundell and Bond 1998Þ by taking into account all the avail-
able moment restrictions. Taking first differences and using instrumen-
tal variables also deals with the potential bias induced by the relatively
short panel. The results, reported in the next section, are remarkably
stable across specifications and estimation methodologies.
Finally, our specification assumes that the control variables and fixed
effects in ð1Þ capture the main determinants of risk-taking behavior. One
concern could be that a higher concentration of athletes with very similar
performance may affect an individual’s behavior. Similarly, the absolute
distance from the closest athletes ðfollowing or precedingÞ in the ranking
may also make a difference. Risk taking may be more rewarding if an
athlete leads the closest trailer by a relatively substantial amount but trails
the closest leader by relatively little.We explore these issues in our robust-
ness analysis. None of our results change in any fundamental way.
B. The Determinants of Performance
We estimate the impact of interim rank on performance using the linear
probability model
Successitjs 5 Xitjd0 1 g ðRankitjðs2 1Þ; d1Þ1 d2Announcementitjs 1 uitjs ; ð4Þ
where Successitjs is a binary indicator that takes the value of one if athlete
i in year t in competition j at stage s ðs 5 2; : : : ; 6Þwas successful in lifting
the announced weight ðAnnouncementitjsÞ;21 Xitj is the same vector of ex-
ogenous individual and competition characteristics as before; Rankitjðs21Þ
is the interim rank of individual i in year t and competition j in the pre-
vious stage; and uitjs is an error term that captures unobserved determi-
nants of a successful lift. Our main interest is in the vector of parameters
d1 in the flexible functional form g ð Þ, which describes the impact of rank
on the probability of success, controlling for announcement. As above,
we require g ð Þ to be linear in the parameters d1. The parameter d2 de-
scribes the impact of announcement on the probability of a successful
21 The first stage of snatch is dropped because the interim ranking is not defined for the
first stage.
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lift. In terms of figure 1, it is an estimate of the average slope of athletes’
risk-reward frontier.
As before, we need to account for unobserved heterogeneity. The un-
observed ability of athletes, for example, is likely to be correlated with
both interim ranking and the probability of a successful lift. Thus, the
random-effects assumption seems unrealistic, and we consider a fixed-
effects framework. We correct for unobserved heterogeneity by exten-
sively controlling for fixed effects. In particular, the error term in ð4Þ can
be decomposed as in ð2Þ:
uitjs 5 ti 1 tt 1 tj 1 ts 1 tit 1 tjt 1 tij 1 titj 1 hitjs; ð5Þ
where hitjs describes the random component of performance, hitjs ∼
IIDð0; j2
h
Þ.22 This idiosyncratic component allows for random errors by
the athletes or for unforeseen circumstances affecting the performance
of an athlete during a lift. As above, our most general specification allows
for athlete-year-competition fixed effects.
The assumption of strict exogeneity of interim rank and announce-
ment in ð4Þ is likely to be violated, since both variables may depend on
the outcome of previous attempts.23 We then proceed under the assump-
tion that such variables are predetermined. Including Rankitjðs21Þ and
Announcementitjs in a single vector Zitjðs21Þ, we assume that Eðhitjsjtitj ; Xitj ;
Zitjðs21Þ; Zitjðs22Þ; : : : ; Zitj1Þ5 0. First-differencing model ð4Þ, we obtain
DSuccessitjs 5 DZitjðs21Þv1 1 Dhitjs: ð6Þ
As before, lagged predetermined regressors can be used as instru-
ments. In contrast to the results on risk taking, we will show that control-
23 The correlation between interim ranking andprevious performancemay give rise to an
upward bias in the impact of interim rank on performance. This endogeneity problem is
different from the so-called sophomore slump caused by mean reversion, a misleading re-
sult that is sometimes mentioned in the popular press. This is typically obtained by trying
to explain changes in performance between periods t and t 2 1 using the level of per-
formance in t 2 1.
22 The assumption that hitjs ∼ IIDð0; j2hÞ implies that there is no correlation between hitjs
and εitjr. This assumption is not essential for identification, but it simplifies the analysis and
is realistic in our application. The shocks hitjs capture events that occur during the compe-
tition andmay affect the performance of the athletes ðe.g., the behavior of the public during
the competitionÞ. Any variable that is fixed at the individual level for a given competition is
captured by the athlete-year-competition fixed effects. Conversations with coaches and ath-
letes indicated that athletes typically concentrate on successfully lifting theweight chosen by
their coaches. Although coaches and athletes do communicate during the game, it is unlikely
that the coach incorporates in the announcement decision the idiosyncratic effects cap-
tured by the error term hitjs. Moreover, the variables captured by hitjs are likely to be realized
only during—or just before—the attempt, so they are unlikely to affect the announcement
decision.
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ling for unobserved heterogeneity and accounting for endogeneity greatly
affect the estimated impact of interim rank on performance.
The model presented in this section provides considerable computa-
tional advantages over a limited dependent variable model with endoge-
nous explanatory variables and fixed effects. In fact, few results are avail-
able for this class ofmodels ðsee Arellano andHonore´ ½2001 for a surveyÞ.
In practice, one has to weigh the simplicity and flexibility of the linear
fixed-effects framework against the obvious disadvantage that the pre-
dicted probabilities may not lie between zero and one ðsee Bernard and
Jensen 2004Þ. In our application, the linear model is particularly appeal-
ing because it avoids putting restrictions on the correlation between re-
gressors and individual heterogeneity. In the next section, we provide
extensive robustness analysis using alternative specifications and also a
fixed-effects logit model. The results are not affected in any fundamental
way.
IV. Empirical Results
A. The Impact of Rank on Announcement
We first explore the relationship between interim rank and announce-
ment using a fully flexible binary-variable specification for f ðRankitjðs21Þ;
b1Þ,
f ðRankitjðs21Þ; b1Þ5 o
n
b1nRankðnÞitjðs21Þ;
where RankðnÞitjðs21Þ is an indicator variable equal to one if individual i is
ranked nth at the end of stage s 2 1. Table 2 reports results for model ð1Þ
using alternative fixed-effects specifications.24 Column 1 provides the es-
timated coefficients when we control for athlete, year, and competition
fixed effects separately, whereas column 5 reports the estimates from our
richest specification ðincluding joint athlete-year-competition fixed ef-
fectsÞ. The omitted rank category throughout the table corresponds to
the athlete ranked first, so all the rank coefficients measure the impact
of being ranked nth relative to being first.
Figure 2 plots the estimated coefficients from table 2 to facilitate com-
parison. Two clear patterns emerge. First, when lagging behind, compe-
titors tend to adopt riskier strategies than those in the lead. Second, risk
taking exhibits an inverted-U relationship with rank: announcements in-
crease from first to sixth place but then decrease for further decreases in
rank until seventeenth place, after which there is no significant effect.
24 Throughout the paper, we report robust standard errors clustered by athlete. All equa-
tions include stage of the competition binary indicators. Table 2 reports the coefficients of
only the first 13 rank dummies; the full table is reported in the online appendix ðtable A1Þ.
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The relation is precisely estimated, and the alternative fixed-effects spec-
ifications provide very similar results.25
Table 3 reports results for model ð3Þ, where we approximate f ðÞ using
a fifth-order polynomial of Rankitjðs21Þ. Column 1 reports the results ob-
tained with the fixed-effects estimator. Column 2 reports those obtained
by taking first differences to eliminate the athlete-competition-year fixed
effects and then using the IV estimator ðwhere instruments are the once-
lagged regressorsÞ. Column3 reports the results obtained from themodel
in first differences using the GMM estimator, which exploits all the avail-
able moment restrictions.26 Figure 3 plots the impact of interim rank on
announcement for each estimation strategy.
The inverse-U relationship between interim rank and announcement
clearly emerges from all estimation strategies. Announcements increase
fromfirst to sixth place but then decrease for further decreases in rank. A
change in ranking from first to somewhere between eleventh and fif-
teenth has no impact on an athlete’s announcement. The relationship
progressively flattens toward the bottom of the ranking, where changes in
rank have little impact on behavior.
The nonlinear impact of interim rank on announcement is always sta-
tistically significant. Relative to the fixed-effects estimators in figure 2, ac-
counting for endogeneity implies amore pronounced peak in the impact
of rank on announcement. When ranked sixth, an athlete announces at
least 1.8 kg more than when ranked first, which is 50 percent of the aver-
age increase in announcement between two stages ðsee table 1Þ.
The other estimated coefficients in tables 2 and 3 are in line with ex-
pectations. Both the impact of the previous announcement and the suc-
cess indicator are positive and significant, as athletes cannot decrease
their announcement andmust increase it after a successful attempt. Also,
in columns 1–3 of table 2, we can estimate the impact of some athletes’
characteristics. Being heavier ðwithin a given category in a specific com-
petitionÞ implies higher announcements. This confirms a well-known fact
in weight lifting that a higher body mass allows athletes to lift heavier
weights. The number of competitors has a positive but very small effect
on announcement.27 Finally, competing at home does not seem to in-
duce athletes to take greater risks, as the coefficient on Homeitj is never
significant.
25 Figure A1 plots the estimated coefficients and confidence interval on the 20 rank binary
indicators from our most restrictive specifications in table 2, col. 5.
26 We choose to use a smooth function f ð Þ to reduce the number of parameters to be
estimated and the number of instruments. The results do not change using higher-order
polynomials, and the coefficients of the sixth or higher power of Rankitjðs21Þ are never signif-
icantly different from zero.
27 The coefficients in table 2, col. 3, indicate that having 10 additional participants im-
plies an average increase of 0.08 kg in announcement.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B. Interpretation of the Impact of Rank on Announcement
Conventional wisdom from sports competitions tells us that the trailing
team may have a large incentive to adopt riskier strategies in an attempt
to catch up with the leaders ðGrund and Gu¨rtler 2005Þ. Similarly, it has
been argued that troubled firms and interim losers in corporate tour-
naments are more likely to take riskier strategies than market leaders
ðBowman 1982; Knoeber and Thurman 1994; Brown et al. 1996; Cheva-
lier and Ellison 1997Þ.28 The fact that the impact of rank is positive up to
rank 17 is broadly consistent with this literature.
The progressive flattening of the relation after the first six positions is
also consistent with differences in risk-taking behavior at different points
in the ranking.29 Some additional details further support the link between
the results in figure 2 and differences in risk-taking behavior at different
positions in the ranking. If changes in the benefits deriving from risk taking
drive the results in figure 2, then we expect to observe particularly large dif-
ferences between the estimated coefficients at ranks 1 and 2, for while the
leader has no gain from variability in rank, the second athlete may signif-
icantly gain from rank variability. We also expect to observe large differ-
FIG. 2.—The impact of rank on announcement. The figure plots the estimated impact of
rank on announcement ðin kilogramsÞ. The coefficients of the binary indicators for rank
positions are reported in table 2 and table A1. The different lines on the graph correspond
to the five columns of table 2, where we control for different sources of unobserved hetero-
geneity. The omitted category always corresponds to the athlete ranked first, so all the rank
coefficients measure the impact of being ranked nth relative to being first.
28 This intuition has been formalized by Goriaev, Palomino, and Prat ð2001Þ, Cabral
ð2003Þ, and Anderson and Cabral ð2007Þ.
29 Since rewards are decreasing at a decreasing rate going down in the ranking, the ben-
efit from variability in rank is expected to decrease substantially toward the bottom of the
ranking, where catching up with the leaders becomes progressively more unlikely.
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ences between ranks 3 and 4. In fact, prizes in weight lifting competitions
display a significant discontinuity between third and fourth rank. This pro-
vides incentives to take riskier strategies when ranked fourth than when
ranked third.30
We find strong support for these hypotheses: the coefficient for rank 2
is statistically different from zero at conventional levels ðtable 2, col. 5Þ,
and so is the difference in coefficients between ranks 3 and 4 ðFð1,
3,762Þ5 11.47, p -value5 .001Þ.Moreover, thedifferences between ranks 1
and 2 ð0.397 kgÞ and between ranks 3 and 4 ð0.235 kgÞ are larger than any
other difference between adjacent ranks.
TABLE 3













Announcementitjðs21Þ .536*** .727*** .697***
ð.004Þ ð.006Þ ð.006Þ
Successitjðs21Þ 2.738*** 3.318*** 2.824***
ð.071Þ ð.133Þ ð.096Þ
Rankitjðs21Þ .363*** 1.539*** 1.233***
ð.077Þ ð.177Þ ð.154Þ
Rank2itjðs21Þ 2.045*** 2.184*** 2.165***ð.009Þ ð.019Þ ð.018Þ
Rank3itjðs21Þ  1022 .168*** .802*** .748***ð.046Þ ð.092Þ ð.086Þ
Rank4itjðs21Þ  1023 2.026** 2.152*** 2.144***ð.010Þ ð.019Þ ð.018Þ
Rank5itjðs21Þ  1025 .014* .103*** .099***ð.008Þ ð.014Þ ð.014Þ
Observations 27,700 27,700 27,700
Clusters 3,763 3,763 3,763
Note.—The dependent variable is the announcement by athlete i, in year t, in competi-
tion j, at stage s of the game. Column 1 is estimated using athlete-year-competition joint
fixed effects. The other two columns are estimated using first differences. In col. 2, we use
as instruments once-lagged predetermined regressors, whereas in col. 3, we use all available
moment restrictions. All equations include stage of the competition binary indicators. Stan-
dard errors clustered at the athlete level are reported in parentheses in col. 1. Windmeijer
ð2005Þ corrected robust standard errors based on a two-step estimation procedure are re-
ported in parentheses in cols. 2 and 3.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
30 The discontinuity in rewards locally affects the concavity of the relation between re-
wards and rank, so that incentives to take risks are drastically different just above and below
this threshold.
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Risk Taking and Absolute Distance from Competitors
The inverted-U relationship of rank on announcement observed in fig-
ure 3 remains unchanged when we control for additional variables po-
tentially affecting risk-taking behavior. For example, we would expect
athletes to take more risks and increase their announcement in an
attempt to overtake their competitor if they are relatively close to the ath-
lete just above them but relatively far from the competitor just below in
the interim rank. On the contrary, we would expect athletes to reduce
risk taking and try to defend their position if they are relatively far from
the competitor just above but close to the competitor below in the inter-
im rank.
For each observation, we compute the difference in score between
each athlete and the athletes ranked just above and below. We then clas-
sify each observation in one of four categories and define four cor-
responding indicator variables: FF when a given athlete is far from both
the athletes leading and following ð1 percent of the observationsÞ, FC
when a given athlete is far from the athlete leading but close to the athlete
following ð4 percentÞ, CF in the opposite case ð5 percentÞ, and finally CC
when both are close ð90 percentÞ.31 We then use CC as the baseline cate-
gory and include the remaining three indicators in model ð1Þ.
FIG. 3.—The impact of rank on announcement. The figure plots the impact of interim
rank on announcement ðin kilogramsÞ based on the estimated coefficients from table 3.
31 We classify two athletes as being far apart if the distance between their interim scores is
higher than the 95th percentile of the distribution of distances in that particular stage. We
also experimented using the 90th or the 75th percentile as the cutoff. Our results qualita-
tively remain the same.
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Results using model ð3Þ are reported in online table A2, column 1. An-
nouncement is 1.2 kg higher when the competitor in front is close but the
trailing athlete is far ðCFÞ relative to the baseline category but 1.2 kg lower
in the opposite case ðFCÞ and not significantly different when both are far
ðFFÞ. Most importantly, the coefficients on rank imply that the pattern in
figure 3 is not affected.32 This further supports the relation between an-
nouncement decision and risk-taking behavior.
Risk Taking and Intensity of the Competition
A second concern could be that a higher concentration of athletes with
similar performance might affect individuals’ risk taking, as competition
becomes more intense. We construct a measure of the intensity of the
competition that varies at the individual level within a competition. Given
the interim score sitjs of athlete i in year t, competition j, and stage s, we
compute the number ðNitjsÞ of athletes k ≠ i with interim score sktjs within
a 10 kg radius: sitjs 2 10 ≤ sktjs < sitjs 1 10. We then construct a binary indica-
tor for tough competitions, which is equal to one when our measure of
intensity of the competition is above 50 percent.33 Table A2, column 2,
reports the results from model ð3Þ when we add the binary indicator for
tough competitions. More intense competition stimulates more risk tak-
ing. Again, the pattern described in figure 3 is not affected.34
C. The Impact of Rank on the Probability of a Successful Lift
We first explore the relationship between interim rank and the probabil-
ity of a successful lift using a fully flexible dummy variable specification:
g ðRankitjðs21Þ; d1Þ5 o
n
d1nRankðnÞitjðs21Þ:
Table4 reports results for model ð4Þ using alternative fixed-effects spec-
ifications.35 The omitted rank category corresponds to the athlete ranked
first, so all the rank coefficients measure the impact of being ranked nth
relative to being first. Figure 4 plots the estimated coefficients from table 4.
35 All specifications include stage-specific dummy variables. Table 4 reports the coeffi-
cients only for the first 10 rank dummies. The full table is reported in the online appendix
ðtable A3Þ.
34 We have also experimented by interacting the indicator for close competitions with the
rank dummies and the other regressors in model ð1Þ. The results are not affected.
33 On average, the fraction of competitors within the 10 kg interval is 26 percent, with a
median of 24 percent. So the 50 percent cutoff level captures the behavior of athletes facing
relatively high concentrations of competitors around them ð90th percentileÞ. Results are ro-
bust to changes in either the radius around an athlete or the cutoff level that we use.
32 The results are consistent with the incentives to take risk discussed in the literature
ðBronars and Oettinger 2001Þ.
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TABLE 4












Rank 2 2.038* 2.040** 2.033 .021 .039
ð.020Þ ð.020Þ ð.022Þ ð.025Þ ð.025Þ
Rank 3 2.056*** 2.058*** 2.042* .041 .070**
ð.022Þ ð.022Þ ð.024Þ ð.026Þ ð.028Þ
Rank 4 2.060*** 2.062*** 2.031 .068** .131***
ð.022Þ ð.022Þ ð.025Þ ð.027Þ ð.028Þ
Rank 5 2.079*** 2.081*** 2.045* .075*** .149***
ð.023Þ ð.023Þ ð.026Þ ð.027Þ ð.030Þ
Rank 6 2.051** 2.054** 2.006 .117*** .202***
ð.024Þ ð.024Þ ð.027Þ ð.029Þ ð.030Þ
Rank 7 2.037 2.041* .018 .148*** .240***
ð.024Þ ð.024Þ ð.027Þ ð.028Þ ð.030Þ
Rank 8 2.012 2.015 .040 .173*** .269***
ð.024Þ ð.024Þ ð.027Þ ð.029Þ ð.031Þ
Rank 9 2.001 2.005 .061** .207*** .310***
ð.024Þ ð.024Þ ð.027Þ ð.029Þ ð.031Þ
Rank 10 .015 .013 .082*** .230*** .338***
ð.025Þ ð.025Þ ð.028Þ ð.029Þ ð.031Þ
Announcementitjs  stage 2 2.014*** 2.014*** 2.015*** 2.021*** 2.022***
ð.001Þ ð.001Þ ð.001Þ ð.001Þ ð.001Þ
Announcementitjs  stage 3 2.013*** 2.013*** 2.014*** 2.020*** 2.021***
ð.001Þ ð.001Þ ð.001Þ ð.001Þ ð.001Þ
Announcementitjs  stage 4 2.012*** 2.012*** 2.013*** 2.018*** 2.019***
ð.001Þ ð.001Þ ð.001Þ ð.001Þ ð.001Þ
Announcementitjs  stage 5 2.012*** 2.012*** 2.013*** 2.018*** 2.019***
ð.001Þ ð.001Þ ð.001Þ ð.001Þ ð.001Þ
Announcementitjs  stage 6 2.012*** 2.012*** 2.012*** 2.017*** 2.018***
ð.001Þ ð.001Þ ð.001Þ ð.001Þ ð.001Þ
Body weightitj ðin kgÞ .009*** .009*** .010**
ð.003Þ ð.003Þ ð.004Þ
Homeitj .073*** .074*** .103***
ð.019Þ ð.019Þ ð.026Þ
Number of competitorsitj 2.004*** 2.005*** 2.007***
ð.001Þ ð.001Þ ð.001Þ
Observations 34,625 34,625 34,625 34,625 34,625
Clusters 3,763 3,763 3,763 3,763 3,763
Athlete fixed effects Yes Yes
Competition fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Competition-year fixed effects Yes
Athlete-competition fixed effects Yes
Athlete-year fixed effects Yes
Athlete-year-competition fixed
effects Yes
Note.—The dependent variable is a binary indicator that takes the value one if the at-
tempt to lift a given weight by athlete i, in year t, in competition j, at stage s of the game was
successful. All equations include stage of the competition binary indicators. Columns 1–3
also include country of origin binary indicators. The coefficients for ranks 11–20 are omit-
ted; the full table is reported in the online Appendix ðtable A3Þ. Standard errors clustered at
the athlete level are reported in parentheses below coefficients.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
In sharp contrast to model ð1Þ, controlling for more sources of unob-
served heterogeneity has a substantial impact on the results reported in
figure 4. There is no significant correlation between interim ranking
and probability of a successful lift when we control for athlete, year, and
competition fixed effects separately.36 However, as we progressively con-
trol for additional sources of unobserved heterogeneity, a positive and
statistically significant relationship appears. This result is driven by an
omitted variable bias. Individuals with higher ability are likely to be
ranked toward the top, and they also perform better on average. When
we do not control for individual characteristics, the rank variable captures
the impact of differences in quality, so the performance at the top of
the ranking is overestimated.37
As discussed in the previous section, controlling for unobserved het-
erogeneity is important but does not account for the possible endogene-
ity of Rankitjðs21Þ. We expect a negative correlation between the lagged er-
36 Some coefficients in table 4 are significantly different from zero, suggesting a negative
impact of rank within a very small range, but these results are not robust.
37 Results using the conditional ðfixed-effectsÞ logit model show the same positive rela-
tionship between rank and success ðtable A3, col. 6Þ. The impact of rank on the log odds of
a successful lift is positive and statistically significant.
FIG. 4.—The impact of rank on the probability of a successful lift. The figure plots the
estimated coefficients of the binary indicators for the rank position from table 4 and table
A3. The different lines on the graph correspond to the five columns of table 4, where we
control for different sources of unobserved heterogeneity. The omitted category always cor-
responds to the athlete ranked first, so all the rank coefficients measure the impact of being
ranked nth relative to being first.
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ror term uitjðs21Þ and Rankitjðs21Þ since a successful lift typically implies an
improvement in the interim ranking at the end of the stage ði.e., a de-
crease of the Rank variableÞ. This generates a positive correlation between
the change in rank ðDRankitjðs21ÞÞ and the error term ðDhitjsÞ of the model
in first differences ð6Þ. Thus, we expect the fixed-effects estimator to be
biased upward.
Table 5, column 1, reports the results obtained with the fixed-effects es-
timator, where g ðÞ is assumed to be a quadratic function of Rankitjðs21Þ.38
Column 2 reports the results for model ð6Þ using once-lagged predeter-
mined regressors as instruments, whereas column 3 reports those ob-
tained using all the available moment restrictions. Figure 5 plots the
impact of interim rank on the probability of a successful lift for each esti-
mation strategy.
There is a significant positive relationship between ranking and the
probability of a successful lift, independently of the estimation strategy
adopted. Conditional on the announced weight, the probability of a suc-
cessful lift is at least 10 percent higher when an athlete is sixth rather than
first. The relation between rank and performance is slightly concave, im-
plying decreasingmarginal effects ofmoving down in the ranking. The IV
estimation strategies reveal that the fixed-effects estimator is indeed bi-
ased upward. The magnitude of the impact of rank is now much smaller,
at least half of that obtained with the fixed-effects estimator.39
Finally, the results in table 5 show that the estimated impact of An-
nouncementitjs is always significantly negative, as expected. Higher an-
nouncements naturally lead to a lower probability of success, as the indi-
vidual risk-reward frontier is downward sloping. On average, an increase
of 1 kg in the weight implies a 1.2 percent decrease in the probability of a
successful lift.
D. Interpretation of the Impact of Rank on Performance
The results frommodel ð4Þ imply that moving toward the top of the rank-
ing decreases performance. One potential explanation for this surpris-
ing result is based on contextual/psychological effects. Athletes’ perfor-
mance may deteriorate when the stakes are higher, when the importance
of success is higher ðBaumeister 1985Þ, or when there is more pressure
fromother individuals, whether friendly or not ðZajonc 1965; Baumeister,
38 The results do not change using higher-order polynomials, and the coefficients of the
third and higher powers of Rankitjðs 2 1Þ are never significantly different from zero.
39 It is not worthwhile to deliberately fail an attempt, go down in the ranking, and benefit
from a higher probability of a successful lift. Given the average probability of failing an at-
tempt and the realized distribution of scores, the implied gains do not compensate the
losses from forfeiting one attempt.
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TABLE 5













Announcementitjs 2.012*** 2.009*** 2.011***
ð.001Þ ð.001Þ ð.001Þ
Rankitjðs 2 1Þ .053*** .024*** .028***
ð.002Þ ð.004Þ ð.004Þ
Rank2itjðs 2 1Þ  1023 2.461*** 2.343*** 2.381***ð.058Þ ð.106Þ ð.104Þ
Observations 27,700 27,700 27,700
Clusters 3,763 3,763 3,763
Note.—The dependent variable is a binary indicator that takes the value one if the at-
tempt to lift a given weight by athlete i, in year t, in competition j, at stage s of the game was
successful. Column 1 is estimated using athlete-year-competition joint fixed effects. The
other two columns are estimated using first differences. In col. 2 we use as instruments
once-lagged predetermined regressors, whereas in col. 3 we use all availablemoment restric-
tions. All equations include stage of the competition binary indicators. Standard errors clus-
tered at the athlete level are reported in parentheses in col. 1. Windmeijer ð2005Þ corrected
robust standard errors based on a two-step estimation procedure are reported in parenthe-
ses in cols. 2 and 3.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
FIG. 5.—The impact of rank on the probability of a successful lift. The figure plots the
impact of interim rank on the probability of a successful lift based on the estimated coeffi-
cients from table 5.
Hamilton, andTice 1985Þ.40 Stakes are higher at the top of the ranking, as
are the importance of a successful lift and the potential pressure created
by the public and the media. This suggests that athletes may perform
worse when ranked closer to the top. The coaches we interviewed re-
ported that it is expected for athletes to perform systematically better in
training sessions than in competitions, which suggests that psychological
pressure may indeed be important.
Prestigious versus Nonprestigious Competitions
There is no doubt that prizes ðboth monetary and notÞ and media cover-
age are much higher for the Olympic Games and World Championship
than for the European Championship. Thus, one would expect pressure
to be higher ðandhence performance to be lowerÞ in themost prestigious
competitions. Alternatively, one might expect athletes to exert more ef-
fort and perform better in more prestigious competitions. This second
hypothesis is consistent with the existing literature ðbriefly summarized
in Sec. IÞ linking the value of prizes in contests to competitors’ effort.
We interact all explanatory variables ðrank and stage binary indicators
and announcement at each stageÞ in model ð4Þ with a binary variable
equal to one for less prestigious competitions ðEuropean Champion-
shipsÞ and zero otherwise.41 Table 6 reports the impact of interim rank on
performance in the two types of competitions ðcomputed for the average
announcement at each stageÞ, which are also plotted in figure 6.42
Performance is significantly lower in more prestigious competitions:
the average difference in the two curves in figure 6 is 13 percent.43 These
40 The psychological literature suggests at least two reasons for which choking may occur
in our setting. First, there may be an optimal level of arousal for performing a given task,
beyond which increasing incentives may result in poorer performance ðYerkes and Dodson
1908Þ. Second, increased pressure may make people unconsciously switch from automatic
to controlled mental processes, in spite of the fact that automatic processes provide higher
performance for some types of highly rehearsed tasks ðBaumeister 1985Þ. Sports—such as
weight lifting—involving repetition of the same actions are typical cases of such tasks.
41 The European Championships take place every year, whereas the World Champion-
ships alternate with the Olympic Games, taking place every 4 years. So there are many in-
stances in which the same athlete can participate in both types of competition during a sin-
gle year.
42 Denote byP prestigious competitions and define the indicator variable P equal to one
for prestigious competitions. Table 6 reports dPn RankðnÞ1 ð1=5ÞosðlPsAnnouncement*s 1 tPs Þ
for each rank n, both for prestigious ðP5 1Þ and nonprestigious competitions ðP5 0Þ, where
Announcement*s is the average announcement for stage s, and t
P
s is the estimated stage-
specific coefficient. Table A4 in the online appendix reports the estimated coefficients con-
trolling for athlete-year fixed effects, which is the most restrictive specification we can use.
43 To control for self-selection of athletes into the two types of competitions, we reesti-
mate the samemodel restricting the sample to those athletes who participated in both com-
petitions in the same year. The impact of interim rank is reported in table 6, cols. 3 and 4.
The results are substantially unaffected, although the average distance between the two
curves is slightly smaller ð9 percentÞ.
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TABLE 6
The Impact of Rank in Prestigious and Nonprestigious Competitions
All Athletes










Rank 1 .070* .016
ð.040Þ ð.055Þ
Rank 2 .116*** .000 .055 2.010
ð.039Þ ð.032Þ ð.060Þ ð.066Þ
Rank 3 .160*** .000 .052 2.040
ð.039Þ ð.034Þ ð.059Þ ð.063Þ
Rank 4 .163*** .048 .047 2.065
ð.039Þ ð.036Þ ð.063Þ ð.065Þ
Rank 5 .165*** .059* .050 2.028
ð.040Þ ð.036Þ ð.066Þ ð.062Þ
Rank 6 .220*** .094*** .104 2.070
ð.041Þ ð.037Þ ð.068Þ ð.066Þ
Rank 7 .255*** .122*** .126* 2.003
ð.041Þ ð.037Þ ð.070Þ ð.067Þ
Rank 8 .283*** .148*** .100 .039
ð.041Þ ð.037Þ ð.069Þ ð.066Þ
Rank 9 .315*** .183*** .157** .054
ð.042Þ ð.037Þ ð.069Þ ð.070Þ
Rank 10 .350*** .199*** .177** .093
ð.043Þ ð.037Þ ð.074Þ ð.068Þ
Rank 11 .362*** .230*** .197** .055
ð.043Þ ð.037Þ ð.076Þ ð.069Þ
Rank 12 .378*** .272*** .153* .150**
ð.045Þ ð.038Þ ð.079Þ ð.073Þ
Rank 13 .430*** .281*** .235*** .116
ð.045Þ ð.038Þ ð.083Þ ð.071Þ
Rank 14 .422*** .300*** .276*** .088
ð.048Þ ð.038Þ ð.088Þ ð.077Þ
Rank 15 .500*** .327*** .312*** .149**
ð.050Þ ð.038Þ ð.095Þ ð.075Þ
Rank 16 .487*** .369*** .221** .185**
ð.051Þ ð.039Þ ð.091Þ ð.084Þ
Rank 17 .520*** .383*** .349*** .195**
ð.057Þ ð.041Þ ð.094Þ ð.081Þ
Rank 18 .516*** .416*** .147 .237***
ð.063Þ ð.040Þ ð.154Þ ð.077Þ
Rank 19 .566*** .448*** .167 .216**
ð.066Þ ð.042Þ ð.135Þ ð.090Þ
Rank 20 .649*** .501*** .440*** .226***
ð.052Þ ð.036Þ ð.090Þ ð.065Þ
Observations 34,625 7,385
Clusters 3,763 523
Athlete-year fixed effects Yes Yes
Note.—The table reports the impact of interim rank on the probability of a successful
lift for the average announcement: dPnRankðnÞ1 ð1=5ÞosðlPs Announcement*s 1 tPs Þ for each
rank n, for both prestigious ðP 5 1Þ and nonprestigious competitions ðP 5 0Þ, where
Announcement*s is the average announcement for stage s, and t
P
s is the estimated stage-
specific coefficient. The impact of rank 1 in prestigious competitions is normalized to zero.
The estimated coefficients using athlete-year fixed effects are reported in the online Appen-
dix ðtable A4Þ. The sample size in cols. 3 and 4 is restricted to the athletes that participated
in both types of games in the same year.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
findings suggest that psychological pressure may indeed dominate the
increased effort in important competitions. Moreover, the fact that both
curves in figure 6 are upward sloping shows that the positive relation be-
tween rank and performance is robust when controlling for possible dif-
ferences between the two types of competition.44
Tiredness
An alternative interpretation for our results could be that athletes at the
top of the ranking are more fatigued, having successfully lifted heavier
weights, and so their performance may decrease in subsequent attempts.
We find this explanation unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, it is not nec-
essarily the case that a successful attempt is more tiring than a failed one.
Hence, it is not necessarily true that athletes are more tired when ranked
at the top, since an athlete may be ranked at the bottom after a series of
ambitious—yet unsuccessful—attempts. Second,we reestimatemodel ð6Þ
controlling for tiredness using the cumulative weight attempted in previ-
ous stages. Results from table 7, column 2 ðcol. 1 simply reproduces col. 3
from table 5 to ease comparisonÞ, reveal that its impact is negative but
FIG. 6.—The impact of rank on the probability of a successful lift in prestigious and non-
prestigious competitions. The figure plots the impact of interim rank ðand the 95 percent
confidence intervalÞ on the probability of a successful lift ðcomputed for the average an-
nouncement at each stageÞ in prestigious and nonprestigious competitions based on the re-
sults reported in table 6. The impact of rank 1 in prestigious competitions is normalized to
zero. Estimated coefficients are reported in table A4. Calculated standard errors are clus-
tered at the athlete level. Performance is significantly lower in prestigious competitions
ð joint test: F ð19, 3,762Þ 5 4.14, p -value 5 .000Þ.
44 We also estimate the impact of rank on risk taking in the two types of competition, con-
trolling for athlete-year fixed effects. We find that announcements are higher in more pres-
tigious competitions, particularly toward the bottom of the interim ranking. Results are re-
ported in table A5 and fig. A2.
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small and that it leaves the impact of rank on performance virtually un-
changed.45
The Effect of Intensity of Competition
In principle, performance at the top may decrease as a result of weaker
incentives to perform well. This seems unlikely since our data refer to in-
ternational competitions with substantial rewards, in which athletes are
likely to exert maximum effort. Still, we try to control for possible con-
founding factors. If incentives are lower when competition is less intense
and competition is systematically less intense at the top of the ranking,
then performance may be decreasing moving toward the top of the rank-
TABLE 7






















Announcementitjs 2.011*** .000 2.009*** 2.011*** 2.012***
ð.001Þ ð.002Þ ð.001Þ ð.001Þ ð.001Þ
Rankitjðs 2 1Þ .028*** .036*** .024*** .023*** .041***
ð.004Þ ð.007Þ ð.004Þ ð.007Þ ð.005Þ







Observations 27,700 27,700 27,700 27,700 20,775
Clusters 3,763 3,763 3,763 3,763 3,763
Note.—The dependent variable is the announcement by athlete i, in year t, in competi-
tion j, at stage s of the game. Tiredness is the number of cumulative kilograms attempted.
Close competition is a dummy equal to one if competitors’ density within a 10 kg radius is
high. Potential gains is the potential change in rank if successful. All equations include stage
of the competition binary indicators. Column1 simply reproduces col. 3 from table 5 to ease
comparisons. In col. 5 we exclude from the estimation the last stage of the competition.
Windmeijer ð2005Þ corrected robust standard errors based on a two-step estimation proce-
dure are reported in parentheses.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
45 The impact of announcement drops, but this is simply a result of the high correlation
between announcement and cumulative weight attempted in previous stages. The results
are unchanged when including the interaction of cumulative weight and interim rank.
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ing, without any psychological pressure. This hypothesis suggests control-
ling for intensity of the competition in model ð4Þ.46
We estimate model ð6Þ including our measure of intensity of the com-
petition ðas defined in Sec. IV.BÞ among the regressors. The new variable
depends on the previous history of the competition, so it is treated as pre-
determined. Table 7, column 3, reports the results. The impact of the in-
dicator for close competitions is negative and significant. On average, be-
ing in close competition decreases the probability of a successful lift by
about 14 percent.47 Most importantly, the positive impact of interim rank
on performance suggests that our results are not driven by the impact of
intensity of the competition on effort.
The Potential Gains from a Successful Lift
Another potential explanation for our results is that, for a given announce-
ment, the potential gain in rank from a successful lift may increasemoving
toward the bottom of the ranking, leading to an increase in an athlete’s ef-
fort and performance. To measure this effect we compute for each obser-
vation the potential improvement in rank position in case of success, given
the observed performance of all the other competitors.48 As expected, we
find that there is an increase in the potential gain from a successful lift as
one moves toward the bottom of the ranking; however, the potential gain
in rank is on average small, so that individuals at the bottom of the interim
ranking are extremely unlikely to reach the top positions and be awarded
significant prizes.49
We reestimate model ð6Þ including this measure of potential gains
among the regressors. Its impact on the level of performance is not statis-
tically significant ðtable 7, col. 4Þ. The impact of rank on performance is
still positive and highly significant. Thus, the impact of rank on perfor-
mance is unlikely to be caused by differences in incentives to exert effort
at the top and at the bottom of the ranking.
Secured Positions
Some athletesmay have secured their position before the end of the com-
petition and hence may have little incentive to perform well. Since there
46 The literature suggests that effort ðand therefore performanceÞmay be affected by the
intensity of competition ðEhrenberg and Bognanno 1990Þ.
47 The impact of rank on performance remains unaffected even when we include the in-
teraction between intensity of the competition and interim rank. The coefficient of the in-
teraction variable is not significantly different from zero.
48 This is equal to the athletes’ expected improvement in ranking in case of successful
lifts, if athletes can perfectly predict the outcome of other players’ attempts.
49 At rank 10, e.g., the average gain in case of success is 1.6 rank positions, at rank 20 it is
3.7, and at rank 35 it is 8.9.
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is no penalty for not attempting the announced weight, athletes in such
situations typically skip their attempt and their performance is re-
corded as a missing value in our data. In the raw data, there are few
instances ð1 percentÞ in which this occurred, and the corresponding
observations are excluded from our sample. The issue of having se-
cured a satisfying position is mostly relevant at the last stage of the com-
petition. Thus, we reestimate the model, dropping the observations for
the last stage. The impact of interim rank on performance is unaffected
ðtable 7, col. 5Þ.
V. Conclusions
We provide evidence of how risk taking and performance change de-
pending on the interim rank position within a tournament. First, we
show that professional athletes take greater risks when ranked close
enough to the first athlete but then revert to safer strategies when
ranked lower. This result is in line with the intuition that laggards may
increase risk taking in an effort to catch up with the leaders. We also
show that risk taking increases in more intense and in more prestigious
competitions.
Our second set of results concerns the impact of interim rank on per-
formance.50We show that performance decreases as an athlete gets closer
to the top of the interim ranking. This result cannot be explained by
unobserved individual-specific heterogeneity, differences in the inten-
sity of the competition, potential gains from increased performance, or
physical fatigue at different points in the interim rank. We also observe
underperformance in more important competitions and when compe-
tition is more intense, suggesting that underperformance close to the
top may result from psychological pressure.
Although our results suggest that information on relative performance
may hamper performance by increasing psychological pressure, the iden-
tification of the exact channel through which emotions affect perfor-
mance remains an open question. In addition, preferences for relative
statusmay play a role in explaining differences between the performance
of interim winners and losers.51 Combining evidence from the field and
the laboratory may shed light on these issues.52
50 These results are not specific to weight lifting competitions. Genakos and Pagliero
ð2011Þ present similar results from professional athletes in competitive diving, a sport that
requires a very different set of skills ðagility vs. physical strengthÞ.
51 For instance, Azmat and Iriberri ð2010Þ and Blanes i Vidal and Nossol ð2011Þ find that
releasing informationon relative performance increases performance in situations in which
individuals are rewarded according to their absolute ðnot relativeÞ performance.
52 Hannan, Krishnan, and Newman ð2008Þ provide evidence that feedback on relative
performance decreases performance on average, while Eriksson, Poulsen, and Villeval
ð2009Þ find that there is no significant effect.
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